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2    
I  Introduction 
This report follows up on a previous report (Jullien and Rey (2006)) on the economics 
of telecommunications. The first report mostly focused on two concerns that had emerged in 
the context of mobile to mobile termination: the risk that high termination rates be used by 
operators as a cooperative device (see also Jullien and Rey (2004)), and the risk that high 
termination rates be used to exclude small operators from the market. In this follow up, we 
shall first summarize the content of the previous note and then update it. Based on this we 
shall try to draw some insights that we hope may be useful in the debate on the regulation of 
termination rates.  
 
The European mobile markets have been very dynamic over the last decades and are 
expected to stabilize in most western European countries. Penetration rates as well as volumes 
are high. The market has been driven by voice telephony until now and it is expected that the 
development of data services (including TV and high-speed wireless Internet) will generate 
growth in the near future.   
 
One main characteristic of the European markets compared to some other markets 
such as US or Hong Kong, is that customers are not charged for receiving calls (caller pays 
principle or CPP). In the context of CPP, termination revenues, in particular from fixed 
networks to mobile networks (FTM) have always been considered as an important source of 
revenue for the mobile operator.
3 However a striking feature is the rapid decline of 
termination rates over the last decade, mostly driven by national regulators. As an illustration, 
in France, the (regulated) termination rates of the two main mobile operators (France Telecom 
and SFR) has declined steadily from 20.12 cts/mn  in 2002 to 6.5 cts/mn in 2008 (the rate of 
the third operator declined from 27.49 cts/mn to 8.5 cts/mn).
4 This evolution has induced a 
                                                 
3 See our discussion of this point in the conclusion.  
4 Source: ARCEP 
3   decline in the share of termination in the revenue of mobile operators. A similar pattern can be 
found in most European countries.  
Apart from this reduction in termination rates, the industry has undergone a permanent 
evolution. The most noticeable evolution is the development of 3G and the large investments 
it requires. This puts the industry at a critical stage where the outcome is very sensitive to 
regulatory decisions. In particular it is important to avoid that current regulatory decisions 
aimed at reducing prices be perceived as bad signals for the future of 3G mobile telephony, or 
the future of the fibber to the home market.  
 
  In terms of regulation, the situation has evolved in a contrasted way. On one hand, the 
new European framework for the regulation of electronic communication has clarified the 
regulatory process, and helped regulation to focus on the wholesale market. On the other hand 
there has been pressure by political authorities and regulators to reduce prices. Moreover the 
roaming regulation introduced in 2007 is a shift in the policy of the European Commission 
from rule making to direct regulation as it imposes price-caps on both retail prices and 
wholesale prices for international calls. More recently the proposal of the "draft Commission 
Recommendation on the regulatory treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates in the EU" 
shows a shift toward more harmonization and centralisation of regulation. 
 
The development of the 3G market is concomitant to the convergence of various IT 
technologies, including telecommunications, internet, TV. In France for instance this has 
resulted in a wave of consolidation between ISP, fixed and mobile operators.  
 
Another noticeable evolution is the emergence of new competitors and in particular 
the development of mobile virtual networks (MVNOs). Although the speed of development of 
MVNOs varies from one country to the other, this puts increasing competitive pressure on  
the industry and should generate some commercial innovation in the future. 
 
Finally let us mention that while the market has been traditionally dominated by post-
paid and pre-pay contracts based on a price per minute of call, along with subscription fees, 
there is been recently a trend toward unlimited offers and increased differentiation between 
4   on-net and off-net calls. Because of this evolution in tariffs, what was valid a few years ago 
may not apply anymore, and conventional wisdom may have to be reconsidered.
5
 
Thus the industry has undergone several important changes during the past few years. 
Our approach in the note is conditioned by these changes as we try to highlight what we 
believe are important contributions of the literature for the understanding of the role of 
termination charges for the industry in its current stage.  
 
The economic literature has also evolved mostly due to the emergence of the literature 
on two-sided markets.
6 The concept of two-sided market, which refers to the fact that the 
value of the service derives from the interactions between actors on different side of the 
market, is now well established. The determination of termination rates is recognized to be an 
issue of two-sided market, along the lines initiated by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1997, 1998) 
and Armstrong (1998). Better understanding of the economics of two-sided markets should 
bring better understanding of the issues involved in the current evolution of the market.  
II  FTM vs MTM 
While the first report focused on MTM (Mobile to Mobile) termination, we should 
emphasize the fact that FTM (Fixed To Mobile) and MTM termination rates have been the 
object of different treatments. 
FTM termination has been treated as a one-way access problem, in which outside 
users pay the operators to access their customers. This is mostly motivated by the fact that 
until recently, fixed line telephony was not competing with mobile telephony. In this context, 
it is well understood (see the survey by Armstrong (2005) for instance) that unless termination 
rates are regulated, mobile operators will unilaterally set excessively high termination rates. 
The most debated question is whether the termination revenue so generated is captured by the 
operators earning larger profits, or passed-on to consumers through lower retail prices on the 
                                                 
5 As will appear later on, the outcome of the market competition is dastrically affected by the 
nature of contractual agreements between operators and their clients. 
6 See Rochet and Tirole (2006) for a recent exposition.  
5   mobile market. The latter possibility is referred to as the "waterbed effect" and we shall 
discuss it at more length in the present report.  
The waterbed effect refers to the fact that termination revenues are at least partly 
competed away on the retail market, as the result of more aggressive pricing by competing 
operators. The reasoning is simple. Incoming termination revenue accrues to the operator 
once the receiver has subscribed, independently of the amount of calls placed by this 
subscriber; it thus constitutes a fixed revenue per subscriber, which reduces the net fixed cost 
(the opportunity cost) of servicing a customer.  A rational operator then reacts to the reduction 
in fixed costs per subscriber by lowering subscription prices (or, given subscribers’ inertia and 
the possibility of mid-term contracts, by rising advertising spending or offering handset 
subsidies). That is, increasing termination rates and revenues results in lower acquisition costs 
(or even transforms them into net acquisition revenues). But it also intensifies competition for 
subscribers and results in lower net subscription prices and enhanced participation.  
Thus the profits generated by termination revenues are shared between the firms and 
their customers.  Depending on the magnitude of the waterbed effect, one may argue that the 
termination revenue has been used to finance the infrastructure fixed cost, or that it has been 
used to boost market expansion with lower prices. We shall discus this point at more length in 
the update section.  
MTM termination has been treated instead as a two-way access problem, in which 
competing operators pay termination revenue to each other. Unlike FTM termination, MTM 
termination cannot be a source of profit for the mobile industry as a whole, since it only 
involves transfers that are internal to that industry. Termination rates may however affect the 
manner in which firms compete, the prices, the distribution of consumers and thus the profits 
as well as the efficiency of the market for mobile telecommunications.  
The effect on equilibrium price can be understood as follows. The termination net 
revenue can be decomposed between revenue from termination of incoming calls and the cost 
of termination on other network. The effect of the revenue from termination of incoming calls 
is similar to the effect of FTM termination, and generates a waterbed effect of the same 
nature. On the one hand, the outgoing termination expenses increase on average the unit cost 
of calls, since the cost of these calls includes the cost of terminating on other networks, which 
is variable with the calls of the clients. Thus increasing the termination rate increases the 
6   variable cost of calls placed by subscribers, while it reduces the acquisition cost of 
subscribers. That is, increasing termination rates and revenues results in higher prices for 
placing calls and thus lower usage; by reducing acquisition costs, it also intensifies 
competition for subscribers and results in lower net subscription prices. The overall effect 
then depends on factors such as whether access is one-way or two-ways, or the pass-trough 
rate of costs to prices. 
It is well understood that letting the operators unilaterally set their own termination 
rates, without any coordination or regulation, would again result in excessively high rates.
7 
The reason is a combination of two factors. First, the incentive to generate revenue through 
high prices identified for FTM termination is also present if an operator considers only the 
calls terminating on its network. Second, high termination rates may put a competitor at a 
disadvantage and thus constitutes a form of “raising rivals’ costs” strategy.
8  These concerns 
can however be addressed by imposing reciprocity or by forcing firms into bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations. 
But even under reciprocity, firms will understand that the termination rates affect the 
market outcome and set these rates at the levels that are the most profitable, which may not 
coincide with the socially optimal levels.  
Two main concerns have been expressed by both practitioners and academics 
concerning MTM termination. The first is that excessive termination rates may be used as a 
cooperative device, helping the operator to support high retail prices. The second is that large 
firms may use termination charges to exclude smaller firms from the market. 
III MTM termination rates 
The previous report examined the lessons from the economic literature on the need to 
regulate MTM termination rates, as well as the nature of such regulation, focusing on issues 
of excessive cooperation and of exclusion.  
                                                 
7 See Armstrong (2002)  and Behringer (2004, 2006). 
8  The general idea that it may be profitable to act in a manner that raises the costs of rivals 
was introduced by Salop and Scheffman (1983). 
7   III.1 Risk of excessive cooperation 
Our reading of the literature does not support the idea that the European context is 
conducive to the risk that large termination rates help sustain high prices and profits. Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole (1998a) and Armstrong (1998) started the debate by pointing to the fact that 
high termination charges raise the cost and thus the price of communications. In the case 
where contracts are reduced to a single constant unit usage price per minute, this translates 
into high retail prices and profits, despite the fact that termination payments globally cancel 
out. But as soon as one departs from the assumption that operators compete only in usage 
prices, the reasoning loses its substance because high termination charges and revenues will 
intensify the competition in the other dimensions of the offers made to consumers. These 
other dimensions can take many forms, such as handset subsidy or lower prices for non voice 
services, but the literature has focused mostly on two-part tariffs. Already in the same article, 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole point to the fact that the previous conclusion does not hold anymore if 
firms offer two-part tariffs. Indeed, they propose a model where the profit turns out to be 
independent of the termination rate. This conclusion has been extended in various ways by 
subsequent contributors.
9 Of course the result that profits are neutral to the termination 
charges relies on specific assumptions of the models that are unlikely to hold in practice, but it 
points to the fact that there is no clear relationship between the level of termination charges 
and the final level of profits. The subsequent literature has relaxed the modelling assumptions, 
and the general conclusion that emerges is that in an industry where firms are not too 
asymmetric, firms would rather opt for a low termination rates, even below cost, than for a 
high termination rate. This conclusion was reached for instance by Dessein (2003), 
accounting for demand expansion effects, or by Berger (2004), accounting for the utility of 
receiving calls. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), Gans and King (2001) and Calzada and 
Valletti (2005) reach the same conclusion by allowing for off-net / on-net price 
discrimination. They emphasize the fact that on-net / off-net price discrimination creates tariff 
mediated network effects since above-cost termination charges translate into higher prices for 
off-net calls, making it cheaper to call within the same network than across networks, and 
these network effects intensify competition. 
                                                 
9 Dessein (2003) or Hahn (2004) for instance.  
8   III.2 Risk of insufficient cooperation  
Concerning the risk that the large firms raise termination rates in an attempt to exclude 
smaller firms, the conclusions are less clear-cut.  
Consider first the case where networks that do not charge different price on-net and 
off-net face a symmetric termination charge. The key point to emphasize is that whether a 
high termination charge favours such or such network is not directly related to the size of a 
network but rather to the access deficit or surplus that each operator generates per customer. 
This access deficit or surplus depends on the usage prices and the type of consumers serviced 
by the network. For instance a small network with consumers generating large termination 
surplus, because they receive more calls than they send, would benefit from increasing 
termination rates. 
Thus if there is a risk of eviction of small networks there must be some reason why 
size somehow generates a traffic imbalance in favour of large networks. This is far from 
obvious. For instance Carter and Wright (2003) argue that in the absence of on-net / off-net 
price discrimination, large networks tend to charge lower usage prices than small networks if 
the termination charge is above cost. This is because they have relatively more on-net calls 
and thus lower average cost per minute of call. For this reason, large networks face an access 
deficit and would therefore benefit from lowering the termination charge.  
However, if larger market shares are the sign of larger market power, and larger 
market power allows having larger mark-ups of costs, then large networks may charge larger 
prices than small networks. If the mark-up differential results in lower usage prices for the 
small network, then the small network may incur an access deficit (Laffont-Rey-Tirole 
(1998a)).  
Things are somewhat different when operators charge different prices for off-net calls 
than for on-net calls.  In this case a termination charge above cost induces a higher price for 
off-net calls. As mentioned above this creates network externalities, as consumers then try to 
join the same network as those they will call, in order to benefit from the lower on-net prices. 
With network externalities, size matters. In this case a large network becomes relatively more 
attractive when the termination charge is large, since it is more likely that calls will end up on 
this network than on a small network (Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b)). Hoernig (2007) 
9   extends the argument by accounting for the fact that users also benefit from receiving calls.  
Subscribing to a small network is then costly when off-net prices are high, as this means 
receiving fewer calls.  In these circumstances a high termination rate may favour the large 
network and prevent a small operator from entering. However, it may also help entry if the 
new entrant adopts a marketing strategy that attracts customers generating an access surplus. 
III.3 The Receiver Pays Principle  
To conclude this part, let us note that the contributions discussed so far analyze 
competition under the caller pays principle, which requires that only the callers pay for the 
termination, while receivers are not charged. Most of these conclusions do not hold under the 
so-called receiver pays principle (RPP), where mobile operators charge customers (possibly 
different) prices for placing and receiving calls. In this case the termination charge does not 
affect the total price of a call, but it does affect the repartition of this total charge between 
callers and receivers. Typically, an increase in the termination charge leads to an increase in 
the price for calling and a decrease in the price for receiving calls. For the moment there is 
scarce literature analysing competition in the mobile industry under RPP.
10  T h e  m a i n  
conclusion is that moving to RPP would eliminate the risk that high termination charges lead 
to a cooperative outcome even when only linear prices are charged by the networks. 
Termination charges in this set-up should be used to balance the incentives of callers and 
receivers to respectively place and accept a call, and their optimal level should reflect the 
benefits that each side derives from calls. The problem is then a two-sided problem.
11  
IV Update  
The current situation presents the following paradox. On the one hand, the literature 
on the joint termination agreements points to a tendency to set low MTM termination rates 
under the circumstances encountered in most European countries, in particular when the caller 
pays principle is combined with non-linear tariffs, multi-product competition and some on-net 
                                                 
10 The most noticeable contributions are focused on the internet communication market, see 
Laffont, Marcus, Rey and Tirole (2003), Jeon, Laffont and Tirole (2004), and Hermalin and 
Katz (2004) and (2005). 
11 See Rochet and Tirole (2006).  
10   / off-net price differentiation. Yet, in practice European mobile operators have shown little 
sign of a willingness to reduce MTM termination rates. There is thus a discrepancy between 
the models and reality that one should explain. Possible explanations can be found in some 
contributions but they are not very convincing.  
First one could argue that reality is in between the cases of linear and two-part tariffs. 
But almost no contract involves a unique pure linear price and the cooperative argument 
derived for uniform price depends critically on this assumption. Moreover in some countries 
such as France or UK, post-pay contracts are largely prevalent and still MTM charges are not 
small.  
Another explanation could be the desire of large incumbent operators to impose 
barriers to entry to newcomers. We will discuss this in the section on exclusion, but we should 
notice that for a long time many markets have been protected from entry by spectrum 
regulation anyway, and yet they had MTM charges comparable with others. So this cannot 
explain a general pattern.  
In what follows we shall develop two potential explanations.  The first explanation  of 
this puzzle is proposed by Armstrong and Wright and is based on the idea that arbitrage 
between the fixed and the mobile termination has prevented operators from setting low MTM 
rates, because of the risk that it affects FTM  termination. The second explanation, currently 
developed by Jullien, Rey and Sand, is based on the idea that high MTM rates are a mean of 
maintaining the incentives of the operators to develop the market in the presence of network 
effects, by raising the profitability of small users.  
Before we turn to that, let us discuss the notion of waterbed effect and clarify its 
nature.  
IV.1 Waterbed effect, distribution and efficiency  
As mentioned in section II, the waterbed effect refers to the fact that raising   
termination revenues amounts to reducing the net acquisition cost of subscribers, and that at 
least part of this termination will be redistributed to consumers though lower prices. From 
above, we conclude that the waterbed effect is to be assimilated with the impact of a fixed 
cost per customer on the subscription price. There has been a consistent disbelief from 
11   regulators that the waterbed effect is effective and needs to be accounted for. This is 
surprising because this amounts to a disbelief that costs matter for prices. Or to put it in 
another way, neglecting the waterbed effect amounts to postulating that the only driving force 
of competition on the mobile telephony market is the unit cost of calls, and that fixed 
subscription costs do not matter (this would include handset subsidy, advertising, fixed 
origination and termination costs…).  Yet, even for a monopoly, costs drive prices.   
 
a)  The intensity of the waterbed effect 
One piece of explanation for this disbelief is that while there have been extensive 
theoretical analyses of the waterbed effect, its intensity in practice has not been the object of 
sufficient attention so far. If one has to take the waterbed effect seriously, the main question is 
empirical. How large is the effect? Does it really matters for retail prices? The work by 
Genakos and Valletti (2007) goes into that direction. They provide evidence on international 
data that the waterbed effect exists, but their data does not allow to obtain a precise measure 
of its level.  
The answer to the question of the intensity of the effect is closely related to a simpler 
question which is the pass-through rate of costs into prices, i.e. the change in retail prices 
induced by a reduction in the cost per subscriber. This in turn depends on the degree of 
competition on the market. If the mobile industry were perfectly competitive, there would be 
a one-to-one pass-through of costs to retail prices and a 100% waterbed effect on subscription 
(all termination profits would be competed away). Due to the large costs of developing a 
mobile network, the industry is only imperfectly competitive. In an imperfectly competitive 
there is not a 100% pass-through of costs into prices, but the deviation can go either way. To 
see that notice that the price can be decomposed between the cost and the mark-up, p=c+m. 
The mark-up depends on many factors that affect the intensity of competition such as the cost 
itself, the elasticity of demand, the substitutability between products, capacity constraints, 
dynamic considerations, and so forth. It is thus a complex notion that varies across 
industries.
12 The change ∆p in price is then the sum of the change in the cost and the change 
in the mark-up, given by the relation ∆p=∆c+∆m. As a result the price reacts less than one-to-
                                                 
12 A recent general discussion of this is Weyl (2008), see also Genakos and Valletti (2007).  
12   one to a reduction in the cost when the mark-up decreases as the cost increases. We should 
point here that while it is reasonable to assume that the mark-up indeed decreases when the 
cost increases, this is not necessarily the case.
13  For instance a proportional mark-up, m = x.c, 
implies more than 100% pass-through since a reduction in cost of 1 unit reduces the price by 
1+x units.  
The profit neutrality results obtained in Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998) and many of the 
subsequent work are the consequence of assumptions in these models that imply that the 
equilibrium mark-up is independent of the cost. This corresponds to a 100% waterbed effect 
in level,
14 and this is due to the fact that these models consider “full participation” of 
subscribers and therefore assume that the aggregate demand for subscription is fixed. Relying 
on these models had the advantage of pointing to the key mechanisms at work and the lack of 
robustness of the reasoning based on unit cost of calls, but probably led to some confusion on 
the role of participation and the waterbed effect. Indeed the estimates of Genakos and Valletti 
(2007) suggest that the waterbed effect is significant but less than 100%. Thus a reduction in 
FTM termination rates would result both in an increase in subscription prices and a reduction 
in profits. 
                                                 
13 This is tantamount to saying that the equilibrium profit decreases with the cost, which holds 
unless the price elasticity of demand decreases strongly with the price.   
 
14 1 Euro reduction of the acquisition cost results in 1 Euros reduction in the subscription 
price, in the representation based on the so-called Hotelling model. 
13   An example with a waterbed effect for a monopoly 
Consider an operator that serves a population of potential subscribers of 
mass 1, among which half are willing to pay 7 and half are willing to pay 10 to 
subscribe. We ignore here any variable costs and usage to focus on 
subscriptions. Suppose the cost of subscription is 6 per subscriber and that, for 
each subscriber the operator receives T as FTM termination revenue. The net 
cost of a subscriber is therefore 6 – T.  In this context the operator either 
focuses on half of the subscribers that have a high valuation and charges a 
price of 10, which generates a profit (10 – 6 + T)/2, or attracts all subscribers 
at a price of 7, which generates a profit 7 – 6 + T. Suppose that the termination 
revenue is initially equal to 1. In that case the operator will favour the first 
option, since (10 – 6 + 1)/2 = 5/2 is higher than 7 – 6 + 1 = 2. If the 
termination revenue T rises to 5, the operator will instead favour the second 
option, since (10 – 6 + 5)/2 = 9/2 is lower than 7 – 6 + 5 = 6. Therefore, an 
increase by 4 in the termination revenue, from 1 to 5, triggers a reduction by 3 
in the retail price, from 10 to 7: the waterbed effect is less than one to one.  
Suppose now that, while half of the subscribers are still willing to pay 
7, the other half is willing to pay 12. The operator then charges a price 12 if 
(12 – 6 + T)/2 > 7 – 6 + T, that is, when T is less than 4. Doing the same 
exercise, an increase in T from 1 to 5 yields a reduction of price from 12 to 7, 
and the waterbed effect is therefore larger than 100%. 
We see that to assess the waterbed effect we need to have a measure of 
the demand.    
b)  Extending the waterbed effect: complementary services  
Another dimension that has not been explored so far is the impact of termination 
charges on the complementary services offered by the operator. Typically mobile telephony is 
a composite offer, which includes national calls, international calls, international roaming, call 
reception, SMS, MMS, internet access….. The handset also includes various ad-on such as 
agenda, games, and mp3 music or address book.  Thus one should view the mobile telephony 
as a platform that is shared by several services that may be substitutable (SMS may partly 
substitute to voice) or complement (MMS can complement voice by sending pictures).  
When the termination rates are changed, the revenue per customer is affected and this 
is likely to affect all prices. The reason is that additional services, such as data for instance, 
are part of the commercial strategy that mobile operators develop to attract customers and 
thus to generate termination revenues. Unlike the cost of calls, the cost of these additional 
services is not affected by a change in the termination rates for voice telephony but changes in 
subscription and the terms offered for voice services will affect demand for all services.  
14   Of course, the prices of these services is affected only when they are ad-on or shared 
services, rather than sold as independent services. For instance, in France wireless data 
services are mostly ad-on to voice services, while in the UK there is a significant independent 
demand for these services. 
How a change in the termination rates will affect the prices of the other services is an 
open question on which little is known.  
In a first attempt to gain some insight on this issue, we develop a very simple and 
stylized model to analyze the effect of termination revenue on the price of other services. We 
present in the technical appendix the model of a monopoly that offers two services, one basic 
voice subscription service and an option for data services. This monopoly faces two 
categories of consumers: consumers for voice only, and consumers for voice and data 
services. Both types of consumers generate termination revenue. We then derive the 
monopoly prices for subscription and for data services. Because data services are only sold as 
a complement for voice services, there are in fact only two relevant total prices for 
consumers: the price for voice subscription and the total price for voice with data services. 
The price for data services is then the difference between the latter and the former prices. 
Since both prices (voice alone, voice plus data) are subject to a waterbed effect, the effect of 
the level termination revenue on the difference between these prices depends on the relative 
intensities of these waterbed effects. We show that the level of termination revenue affects not 
only the price for subscription but also the price for data services, except for very specific 
shapes of the demand functions for voice. The model used is highly specific in that it does not 
allow for a transition from voice only to voice plus data when prices are adjusted as a reaction 
to changing termination rates. But even in this context, the effect of termination revenue on 
the price of data services depends on complex factors and in particular on the elasticity of the 
demand for voice and the elasticity of the demand for voice plus data.  
The conclusion is that while the prices of complementary services are indeed affected 
by a change in the level of the termination rates, the direction of this effect cannot be 
predicted based on theoretical considerations only.  
 
15   IV.2  A synthesis: FTM with MTM termination  
A good synthesis of the implications of the waterbed effect can be found in the recent 
work by Armstrong and Wright (2007). They propose a synthesis of the literature on FTM 
and MTM termination charges by considering a model involving both dimensions and two-
part tariffs. If one could set FTM and MTM termination rates separately, operators would 
favour a positive margin on FTM termination (the industry profit increases when costs 
decrease, due to market expansion). On the other hand they would favour a small MTM 
termination charges, in line with the conclusion of many theoretical models. Armstrong and 
Wright argue that the two rates cannot be independent because different rates would lead to 
arbitrage, whereby fixed operators would transform FTM calls into MTM calls. This is a well 
known phenomenon in the telecommunication industry. For instance during the end of the 
period where mobile operators in France were under bill and keep agreements, there has been 
an increase in the practice of transforming FTM calls into MTM calls (this was known to as 
"hedgehogs"). With arbitrage there cannot be too much discrepancy between FTM and MTM 
rates. Another motive for maintaining high MTM when FTM rates are regulated is that any 
attempt to reduce MTM terminations charges could backfire into lower regulated FTM rates, 
as the regulator would take it as a signal that firms are able to accommodate low rates.  
Armstrong and Wright (2007) then analyze the choice of a common rate for FTM and 
MTM termination. The profit maximizing level depends then on the relative magnitude of the 
FTM and MTM traffic and the intensity of retail competition. Their conclusion is that when 
the FTM market is large enough, the operators have an incentive to set the joint FTM-MTM 
rate too high compared to the efficient levels, hence the need of a regulation.  
They also conclude that the socially optimal FTM and MTM rates are above the 
marginal cost of termination. The reason is that leaving some termination profit to the 
operators leads to a market expansion that generates positive network effects.  
The analysis of Armstrong and Wright provides an explanation of the discrepancy 
between casual observation of market practices and the predictions of the theoretical model. 
Although we will propose an alternative/complementary explanation below, we view this as 
convincing argument that explains part of the determination of the current rates, being 
regulated or not.  
16   To conclude this discussion, it is worth noticing that the balance of incentives between 
FTM and MTM is changing over time. While FTM termination may have dominated in the 
past, now that markets have reached a high level of development, the relative size of the fixed 
line market is smaller compared to the mobile telephony market. Thus incentives should be 
more balanced in the future and the industry may prefer lower rates. But it is hard to predict 
when and how such a shift in incentives should occur.   
IV.3  Market segmentation, penetration and heterogeneous usage 
One dimension that has not been the object of sufficient attention to our view is the 
heterogeneity of consumers in the mobile market. This heterogeneity is the source of complex 
and multiple contracts. First, contracts can be distinguished according to whether they are pre-
paid (or pay as you go) contracts or post paid contracts. Second, post-paid contracts are 
complex and do not reduce to simple two-part tariffs. For instance, most of these contracts 
include the choice of a fixed allowance and a unit price above it, as well as various options 
concerning SMS, MMS, or roaming. The literature has shown that the traffic imbalances that 
emerge when consumers are heterogeneous may alter the effect of termination charges. But 
the general view is that it does not alter the conclusions in a well identified way. Indeed 
Dessein (2003) extended the profit neutrality result of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) to the 
case of consumer heterogeneity by allowing the firm to use non-linear contract to screen 
different types of consumers. As Dessein pointed out, departing from his assumptions and in 
particular allowing for demand expansion effects would invalidate the neutrality result but it 
could go either way. The view seems thus to be that consumer heterogeneity is not the key 
factor explaining high rates.
15 This is formally true if one allow for any type of heterogeneity.  
But the market presents some general patterns that may give hints on the type of heterogeneity 
that matters.  
We contend then that understanding the implication specific patterns of observed 
heterogeneity may help explaining why we observe the current level of MTM termination 
rates. Moreover this would clarify the welfare implication of reducing these rates.  
                                                 
15 An exception is Poletti and Wright (2004) who obtain a positive profit maximizing 
termination rate by adding some participation constraints for consumers.   
17   In a contemporary study, Jullien, Rey and Sand (2008) examine the issue of price 
discrimination in such a context. We model a situation involving two mobile operators of 
similar efficiency competing in two-part tariffs on the retail market, with heterogeneous 
consumers. We distinguish between consumers mostly interested in calling, and consumers 
who are mostly interested in the ability to be called. In a nutshell the former would correspond 
best to post-pay consumers, while the latter would rather opt for cheap pre-pay contracts with 
few calls.
16 A critical assumption in the analysis is that "small users" have a demand that is 
more elastic than "large users", which seems quite plausible as the former represents the 
margin of the market (those most likely to renounce on mobile telecommunications if prices 
raise).  
Networks discriminate between the two categories of users by offering different two-
part tariffs. In equilibrium there is no global traffic imbalance between networks but there is a 
traffic imbalance between small and large users. As a result, increasing the termination rate 
raises the profitability of small users, for which there is a net inflow if calls. This intensifies 
the competition for small users, resulting in lower prices for them and enhanced participation.   
The situation involves network externalities (at the industry level) similar to those 
studied in the literature on two-sided markets.
17 Enhanced participation of small users raises 
the value of the network for large users, which may be beneficial both for profit and for 
welfare.  
A first conclusion is that firms favour a termination rate above the marginal cost. A 
second conclusion is that the welfare maximizing termination rate is also above the marginal 
cost. Both conclusions derive from the fact that marginal consumers exert a positive network 
externality on other users, and that increasing the termination rate raises participation. From a 
profit perspective, this allows firms to raise the revenue from large users, while from a 
welfare perspective this raises the surplus of both types of users.  
While the work is still very preliminary, it suggests that in the case of MTM 
termination revenue from fixed networks, the optimal termination rate may be above cost 
when the consumers the most reactive to prices are also the less active on usage.  
                                                 
16 Most pre-pay contracts allow receiving calls long after the minutes of communication have 
been exhausted.  
17  See Rochet and Tirole (2006). 
18   We view the situation as a good representation of the current mobile business model 
of large operators. This provides a rationale for the reluctance of operators to reduce MTM 
termination rates, which is complementary to the explanation based on the link with FTM 
termination revenues (Armstrong and Wright 2007). While for FTM termination the profit 
maximizing margin may be positive or negative, depending on the waterbed effect and 
network effects, the MTM model with heterogeneous consumers described above points to a 
positive termination margin.  
IV.4 Exclusion revisited  
As already mentioned, one of the traditional concerns is that cooperation among 
operators might be insufficient, particularly in markets where large incumbent operators face 
competition from smaller rivals, and may be tempted to charge prohibitively high termination 
rates in order to foreclose the market. One argument echoed by small operators and regulators 
to motivate this concern, and on which we will focus here,
18 is related to the already noted 
network effects generated by termination-based price discrimination. Termination charges 
above cost induce higher prices for off-net calls and, as a result, customers prefer to join 
larger networks, for which a higher proportion of calls remain on-net. Some European NRAs 
have relied on this argument to call for asymmetric MTM termination rates. For example, in 
its Decision of October 2007, the French national regulator stressed the presence of network 
effects due to off-net/on-net tariff differentials that impede smaller networks to compete 
effectively.
19 Similarly, in September 2006, the Spanish national regulator argued that 
network effects can place smaller networks at a disadvantage, and that higher termination 
rates can increase the size of such network effects.
20
To explore this issue, Lopez and Rey (2008) analyze the competition between two 
asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Consumers are initially attached to the 
incumbent network and incur switching costs if moving to the other network. Thus, to build 
market share the entrant must bid more aggressively for customers than the incumbent, which 
therefore enjoys greater market power. In particular, the incumbent can keep monopolizing 
                                                 
18 The discussion here is based on Lopez and Rey (2008). 
19 See section 4.2.2 of ARCEP Decision 2007-0810 of October 4 2007. 
20 Decisions AEM 2006/724, AEM 2006/725 and AEM 2006/726 adopted by the Spanish 
NRA (CMT) on 28 September 2006.  
19   the market when switching costs are large enough; as we will see when switching costs are 
not that large, departing from cost-based termination charges can help the incumbent 
maintaining its monopoly position and protect its profit. 
They first consider the case where networks compete both in subscription fees and in 
usage prices, which can moreover differ for on-net and off-net calls. This termination-based 
discrimination creates network externalities, which are amplified by the level of the 
termination charge. As a result, the incumbent can keep the entrant out of the market and still 
charge monopoly prices by setting a large enough mark-up on the termination rate. Indeed, if 
the incumbent benefits from consumer inertia,
21 then it has an incentive to insist on the 
highest possible (even if reciprocal) access mark-up.  
Lopez and Rey also study competition for levels of switching costs and termination 
mark-ups that are moderate enough to allow the operators to share the market. They show in 
particular that a high termination charge that results in a possibly small but positive market 
share for the entrant gives the incumbent a lower profit than cost-based termination rates.  
The analysis thus supports the conventional wisdom that high termination rates may 
help well-established networks to exclude small competitors; however, high termination 
charges are profitable only when it allows the incumbent to keep the entrant entirely out of the 
market, while they are unprofitable at any positive market of the entrant. This appears to limit 
the foreclosure concern to markets in which potential entrants have been unable to develop 
any customer base.  
Indeed, in the line with our previous discussion of MTM termination rates and results 
obtained by Gans and King (2001) for symmetric networks, they show that when the market 
is shared, lowering the termination rate below cost would raise both networks’ equilibrium 
profits. However, networks may fail to coordinate on the more profitable equilibrium.  
Finally, Lopez and Rey (2008) consider the impact of the termination rate on 
competition in the absence of on-net / off-net price differentiation or under the receiver pays 
principle regime. In the latter case, termination rates can no longer foreclose competition 
                                                 
21 Since on-net pricing generates club effects, consumers face coordination problems and 
there may exist multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices. "Consumer inertia" 
refers to the situation where consumers adopt the response the most favourable to the 
incumbent.  
20   because all usage prices (even on-net ones) are then always set at the off-net cost. In the 
former case, neither the incumbent nor the entrant finds it profitable to foreclose competition 
through termination rates.  Network externalities are thus the key ingredient that allows 
established networks to foreclose competition. Network interconnection should in principle 
eliminate them, but they are restored when the competing operators can charge different 
prices for off-net and on-net calls.  
The analysis clarifies the circumstances under which an exclusionary effect of 
termination rates may be a concern, although we should point that it does so in the context of 
a homogenous population of consumers. As already mentioned in section III.2, and along the 
lines of section IV.4, a new entrant may adopt a strategy of differentiation when tastes vary 
within the population. Indeed market segmentation is a natural outcome when the population 
is heterogeneous and firms differ in cost and quality.
22 When the small operator can design its 
commercial strategy so as to target particular types of clients, it may be more difficult to use 
termination rates for exclusion.  
V  Conclusions 
What do we retain from theses developments?  To summarize the main conclusions 
concerning the difficulties that could arise if firms were left free to negotiate reciprocal rates, 
we found that the risk of excessive cooperation may have received too much attention, while 
there may be instances with insufficient cooperation. Insufficient cooperation seems to be 
associated with on-net/off-net differentiation and tariff mediated network effects. On this 
latter point, we must stress that most of the contributions associate excessive rates with full 
exclusion of the competitor, and that a large operator may not benefit from increasing 
termination rates if this only hurts the small competitor without eliminating it. Thus one may 
not be too concerned about the "raising rivals costs" issues discussed for the case of unilateral 
determination of the termination rates.  
                                                 
22 In France for example, in 2006, the smallest operator Bouygues Telecom has a higher 
ARPU and a higher share of post-paid contracts than the other two operators Orange and SFR 
(the average monthly ARPUs (euros) are  33.7, 37.9, 42 for Orange, SFR and Bouygues resp., 
while the proportion of post-paid subscribers are resp. 63%, 65% and 72%,  Source: Merrill 
Lynch).  
21   Concerning the FTM termination charges, it is often argued that the FTM termination 
revenue has constituted some hidden form of subsidy to the mobile operators that helped them 
to finance the infrastructure. As discussed above, the so-called waterbed effect however 
implies that some benefits are passed-on to customers through lower prices. Thus one could 
also argue that these revenues were rather used to boost market expansions. Which claim is 
valid depends on the intensity of the waterbed effect.  On this we need more studies and 
returns from experiences.   
But more importantly, these claims may not address the right question. The key 
question of the debate on termination rates is "What is the optimal level of termination 
rates?".  
The complexity of deriving optimal rules suggests that the answer may vary from one 
case to the other. It also suggests that the discussion should be based mainly on the evaluation 
of the impact of the termination rates on the retail prices, both in terms of level and structure, 
rather than on ad-hoc principles.  
A first obvious point is that termination is part of the services offered by mobile 
telecommunication operators. In the presence of the large fixed costs required to develop a 
mobile telecommunication network, we know from the work of Laffont and Tirole (2000) on 
access that it is optimal that all services contribute to the financing, including retail and 
wholesale services; this needs however to be tailored to the specificities of the networks. 
From the literature on network externalities and on two-sided markets, we know that a cost 
orientation is not necessarily optimal with two-sided network effects. The literature highlights 
the fact that one should think of termination rates as inducing changes in the price structure 
faced by consumers rather than a change in the level of prices (which is moreover hard to 
define and much more difficult to predict).  
A change in price structure has two types of consequences for welfare. First it 
modifies the behaviour of the users.  Since the same instrument affects the prices faced by the 
two parties involved in the call, choice has to be made on which side it is more efficient to 
incentivize.
23 In addition, it may affect participation as well as usage by those who do join the 
                                                 
23 One insight from the literature on two-sided market is that the price should be somewhat 
biased in favour of the party that generates the highest surplus to the other side. Thus if the 
receiving parties enjoy little utility while the calling parties are the most interested in the call, 
22   network. For example, increasing the termination charge is likely to translate into higher 
usage prices and lower subscription fees, thereby favouring participation over usage.  
 Second changing the price structure  generates some implicit redistribution between 
different categories of consumers (fixed line and mobile lines subscribers, large and small 
users, rich and poor….).  This redistribution is a key effect of the regulation of wholesale 
access tariffs in telecommunication network and is most of the time overlooked. Likewise, it 
would be important to evaluate the redistributive implication of a major change in termination 
rates.  
Policy discussions, at least in the European Union have focussed on a cap on 
termination rates.  If indeed there remain competitive issues in the mobile industry, there exist 
other policies that could present more efficient ways to alleviate them. For instance, while a 
cap on termination-based discrimination may reduce the risk of foreclosure, it would be useful 
to evaluate alternative approaches such as a shift toward the receiver pays principle and, if 
found useful, what policy might be appropriate to promote it.   
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Technical Appendix:
Termination Rates and Complementary Services




In this appendix, we develop a simple model that highlights the po-
tential implications of termination rates on the prices of services that are
o⁄ered as complements of voice telephony by mobile operators, such as
data services. By considering a monopoly operator that o⁄ers two services,
one basic subscription and an option for data services, we show that the
impact on the termination revenue on the price of data, depends on com-
plex factors and in particular on the relative elasticities of the demand for
voice and the demand for voice plus data.
1 The model
To simplify matters, consider a monopolistic operator that o⁄ers two services:
a base service at price p, and an optional extra service at price r: In the case
of mobile telephony, we can interpret the base service as voice and the optional
service as data.1 To simplify the analysis, we suppose that usage is inelastic (all
users are willing to use a given amount of each service, and thus interpret p
and r as subscription prices for each service; we denote by q = p + r the total
price for accessing both services. Notice that we do not allow to o⁄er data only,
which ￿ts the current situation. Allowing such an o⁄er would complicate the
analysis but not alter the conclusions.
Suppose that there are two distinct populations:
￿ Population 1 is interested in the base subscription only and has a demand
D(p);
￿ Population 2 is interested in both the base subscription and data. More-
over all members are willing to pay at most ^ v for the data services: This
1This ￿ts also the case of ￿xed line broadband services, where data could be tought as TV
and base service as internet access.
27means that they all attach the value ^ v to data. Their demand for the sub-
scription alone is Q(p) while their demand for the combined data-voice
services is Q(p ￿ ^ v):
Assume that the per-subscriber cost of base service is c while the additional
cost for data is ^ c < ^ v: In addition, each subscriber generates a net revenue T
from termination (from ￿xed line users, say).
2 General case
The pro￿t of the platform is then
￿ = (p ￿ c + T)D(p) + (q ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)Q(q ￿ ^ v) when q ￿ p + ^ v
and
￿ = (p ￿ c + T)D(p) + (p ￿ c + T)Q(p) when q > p + ^ v
since at q > ^ p + ^ v no consumer buys the data service. Thus we have that the
data service is delivered if
max
p;q￿p+^ v
(p ￿ c + T)D(p) + (q ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)Q(q ￿ ^ v)
is larger than
max
p (p ￿ c + T)D(p) + (p ￿ c + T)Q(p):
This is always the case because at equal price p and q = p + ^ v we have
(p ￿ c + T)D(p)+(p + ^ v ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)Q(p) > (p ￿ c + T)D(p)+(p ￿ c + T)Q(p)
since ^ v > ^ c:
De￿ne p￿ (T) and q￿ (c) as the monopoly prices for voice services and for
combined services under perfect discrimination
p￿ (T) = argmax
p
(p ￿ c + T)D(p)
q￿ (c) = argmax
q (q ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)Q(q ￿ ^ v)
We then have p = p￿ (T) and q = q￿ (T) if q￿ (T) ￿ p￿ (T) + ^ v:
When this is not the case, assuming quasi-concavity we have
p = ^ p(T) and q = ^ p(T) + ^ v
^ p(T) = argmax
p
(p ￿ c + T)D(p) + (p + ^ v ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)Q(p)
Remind that the price for data is de￿ned as r = q ￿ p: We then have
28Proposition 1 The price for data is r(T) = min(q￿ (T) ￿ p￿ (T); ^ v)
Proof. Immediate.
Thus when the self-selection constraint is binding the price for data is un-
a⁄ected by the termination revenue. This is the consequence of the assumption
that all potential buyers of data have the same valuation ^ v and would not hold
with heterogenous demand for data services.
The more interesting case is when the constraint is not binding. Then we
have r(T) = q￿ (T) ￿ p￿ (T): Notice that q￿ (T) ￿ ^ v is the monopoly price that
would be charged by the operator on the second population if the following 3
conditions were met:
i) Third-degree price discrimination is possible;
ii) There is no data service
iii) the cost is c ￿ ^ v + ^ c
Now de￿ne pm (C) and qm (C) as monopoly prices for voice services only on
each population for a cost and no termination revenue. Then we have
p￿ (T) = pm (c ￿ T)
q￿ (T) = qm (c ￿ ^ v + ^ c ￿ T) + ^ v
r￿ (T) = qm (c ￿ ^ v + ^ c ￿ T) ￿ pm (c ￿ T) + ^ v
Thus the e⁄ect of the termination revenue on the price of data depends on
the comparison between the impact of the termination charge on the monopoly
price for each population but evaluated at di⁄erent (opportunity) costs. >From
this we see that the answer to the sign of this e⁄ect is complex and ambiguous
from a theoretical perspective.
3 Examples
3.1 Proportional demands
Assume that the demands for voice services are proportional. This is the case
when Q(p) = ￿D(p): In this case we have
q￿ (T) = argmax
q (q ￿ c ￿ ^ c + T)￿D(q ￿ ^ v)
Now given that qm (C) = pm (C) for proportional demands:
q￿ (T) = p￿ (T + ^ v ￿ ^ c) + ^ v:
The ￿rst result in this case is that because p￿ decreases with T and T+^ v￿^ c > T;
it is the case that q￿ (T) < p￿ (T) + ^ v for all T: We then obtain that
r￿ (T) = p￿ (T + ^ v ￿ ^ c) ￿ p￿ (T) + ^ v
We can thus conclude that
29Proposition 2 When demands for voice services are proportional, the price of
data r￿ (T) decreases with the termination revenue T if p￿ (T) is concave, i.e. if














dT 2 < 0 since ^ v > ^ c:
As an illustration in the cases where the demand is linear, and where the
demand is iso-elastic, the price p￿ (T) is linear and thus the price of data is not
a⁄ected by the termination revenue.
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For ￿ small, we see that the price of data decreases when T increases if ￿ is
positive, hence if demand is convex.
3.2 Iso-elastic demands
Suppose that both demand are iso-elastic then
pm (C) = (1 + m)C
qm (C) = (1 + ￿)C
where ￿ > m if the demand of population 2 is less elastic than the demand from
population 1.
We have
p￿ (T) = (1 + m)(c ￿ T)
q￿ (T) = (1 + ￿)(c ￿ ^ v + ^ c ￿ T) + ^ v
r￿ (T) = (￿ ￿ m)c + (1 + ￿)^ c ￿ ￿^ v + (m ￿ ￿)T
The conclusion is that r￿ (T) decreases if ￿ > m:
30